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This article addresses the experience of exile from an interdisciplinary perspective
(philosophy and psychiatry). The main purpose is to try to understand the experience
of exile by rehearsing a psychopathological perspective to address it, so it can help with
the treatment of disorders that come with this experience. Furthermore, the article tries
to explore the experience and reflection of philosophers and thinkers who, being exiled
themselves, tried to understand and explain this radical human experience, focusing on
the experience of time and space.
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Introduction
Exile has been something permanent throughout the history of mankind. In ancient times, it may
be found the idea that this world dwelled by human beings is not our own home, which has been a
mythic vision widespread in various cultural traditions (1). Exile has been viewed as a paradigm in
which the notion of human life, at least in western culture, is interpreted as being exiled (2).
The experience of exile, throughout the twentieth century until current times, has became an
experience of mass violence and horror, from a political and economical interests of different kinds,
rather as only an individual experience, which reclaims us a reinterpretation of the meaning of
this experience (3, 4). Actually, in 2013, 10.7 millions of people have been displaced as result of
persecutions, political conflicts, generalized violence, or human rights violations, the highest level
since global statics about forced displacements are available (5).
The purpose of this paper is to address the theoretical aspects of exile from an interdisciplinary
perspective (philosophy and anthropologic psychiatry). This work does not look for highlighting
a morbid approach, but moves toward a psychopathological interpretation of the experience of
exile vis-à-vis the work of three exiled thinkers who have explicitly thought this topic from a
phenomenological view: Eduardo Carrasco (Chile, philosopher) (6), María Zambrano (Spain,
philosopher) (7), and José Solanes (Spain, psychiatrist) (1).
It is necessary to clarify that the authors of this paper have not personally experienced any kind
of exile. Thus, the main goal of this work has been the attempt to understand an experience, which
is unknown vividly to us, through the theorization of exiled thinkers who have tried to explain the
meaning and scoops of exile. This raises a methodological difficulty for our work related to the dual
status of the texts we will be working on, since they involve both the theoretical and the first-person
testimonial. Therefore, since we are theorizing on an experience not lived by any individual, wemust
move carefully; avoiding any radical schisms at the descriptive level in our search for commonalities
among the different authors, and arguments as well as explanations they may provide for these
experiences. We welcome this difficulty as a feature without which we could not get the target that
we are addressing. Indeed, we believe that in this controversy we can find the contact between theory
and experience: the “non-experienced” and the ability to understand it.
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The Space and Time of Exile
The word “exile,” from Latin exilium, is derived from exsilire (leap
out). It is defined as the notion of being forced to leave one’s own
space or place (country). The Encyclopedia Britannica highlights
the time spent out of that place, which is to be extended. Thus,
“exile” refers to those who have been forced to leave their own
space for an undetermined and extended time. However, this first
definition cannot be easily countersigned: human history offers an
endless list of several types of exile, which have been interpreted in
different ways. As Solanes points out, difficulties in defining exile
and finding the right word for those who live the experience do
not involve an abstract concept of time and space, but concrete
social and linguistic diversity: “The name of those who live this
experience changes according to the language, political or legal
point of view regarding the moment in the history” (1). This
variety of names shows that none of them explain all what this
experience encompasses. Due to the fact that exiled people do not
have an agreement about how to name their own condition, the
search itself of the meaning about the experience of being exiled
shows a feeling of transformation that the exiled person resists
suffer passively.
Zambrano addresses exile and the problematic nature of the
term polysemy by employing the metaphor of road’s steps: a series
of steps from one experience to another that the exiled person
walks following their expulsion. According to Zambrano, exile
does not feel like such until one begins to feel abandoned (8).
This is what specifically differentiates the exile experience from
refugees and expatriates. The refugee would be the first step of
exile: the refugee finds his space, comfortable or just tolerated,
where his body lies after the expulsion. In the second step, the
expatriated feel landless (homesick) because he does not feel as
own neither the land from which he has been expulsed nor the
land in which he has arrived because this new “homeland” cannot
replace the original one. Thus, being expatriated does not entail
being exiled, but only an expulsion: “the unavoidable distance
and the blurred physical presence of the lost country” (8). In this
phenomenon, the expulsed person begins to feel close to exile’s
border, in its limit, the limit of abandonment. This borderline situ-
ation is experienced to the extent that feeling of belongingness has
been deprived: “In the abandonment what is already dispossessed
appears as own, that which cannot become as belonging to oneself.
Belongingness is only negation, impossibility” (8).
Carrasco’s interpretation of exile coincides with Zambrano’s
view regarding the non-static condition of this experience. The
“leap out” involved in the meaning of “exile” shows that the exile
implies the movement of leaving a demarcation; who has carried
out that movement is located “outside” of his/her own space or in
a different place. According to Carrasco, if the etymology reveals
some of the essence of the phenomenon of exile, it is its instability,
which can be understood as the condition of being neither in the
first nor the second territory: “Exile is to be in any fixed place, not
inside or outside, but suspended in the leap; exile is the leap itself
from the inside to the outside” (6). How does this suspension of
time and space play a role in the life of the exiled person?
As Solanes contends, a significant difference exists between the
emotions after the departure into exile and the arrival into the host
country. There are many writings, stories, testimonies, or songs
about the exile’s departure, but the experiences about the arrival
are covered by a blanket of silence. According to Solanes, this is
due to these emotions and experiences become so hard to com-
municate and analyze: “You breathe more deeply when you know
you are out of reach of your adversaries; but where is and what
is it this place that has provided a safety condition? Surprisingly,
one notes that nothing looks like what is known and what was
imagined.” (1). Nevertheless, the feeling of facing the unusual or
unknown is not due to that the new place is much different to the
previous one; it is not about differences between objects, but the
relationship that the subject has with the wholeness: the totality
of the experienced places. The phenomenon is more an issue of
feeling alien rather than differences between places or objects and
that feeling is not a problem of quantity: “Alienness is clearly a
response to a qualitative diversity that is overall perceived as the
fact of discovering that in some dark way – though sometimes just
funny, but often disturbing – in exile we are personally related to
this larger whole. Being in a qualitatively different world brings
the experience of being alien” (1).
The relationship between the exiled with his/her space refers
not only to an experience with the host land. This place expe-
rienced as alienness is given by the qualitative distance that the
exiled person feels about the place left behind. Carrasco interprets
the bond between the exiledwith that place left backward (his own
“country”) as Solanes does. According to the Chilean philosopher,
it must be distinguished the original country such as appears in
our understanding about it: an abstract disposition of distances,
geopolitical organization, our memories of that country, namely:
“a world that is dwelled from specific meanings, requirements,
obstacles, stimuli, possibilities, objects of desire, fear and different
feelings, callings for thought, imagination, strangeness, astonish-
ment, etc.” (6).
Both authors will address this topic from a phenomenological
view. While the former states that space or “territory” must be
understood “just as it is given in consciousness, namely: such as
the phenomenon itself appears as a aroundnesss (vital landscape)”
(6), the latter speaks in terms of a “qualitative geography” that
emphasizes that any configuration or disposition of space depicts
a mode of being, “it is learning, discovery, invention” (1).
According to this notion of place or space, we should not
understand the idea of country, as Carrasco says, from the current
broader sense of Nation, but as the place from which we come
from (the homeland), that “original where.” Thus, the country or
the “original where” would be the place of the “initial disclosed-
ness that determines us as individuals in some specific situation”
(6). This means that the country, to the extent that is understood
as the “original where” of any traveler, is the reference center
of the exiled people’s life who carry that baggage wherever they
go. From the phenomenological approach of the intentionality of
consciousness assumed by the Chilean philosopher, an individual
is constituted by a concrete circumstance. That means that con-
sciousness mirrors itself as a unity with such-and-such landscape.
All consciousness is essentially determined or concrete what
entails that individuality is a unity between consciousness and
the circumstance in which everyone exists. From this perspective,
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exile can be only shown as a way of living the own belongingness
to the country, a way of currying the own country.
Zambrano also recognizes the fundamental meaning of that
original space. She argues that the notions of homeland, land, or
home refer to the same idea: they are areas or enclosures or differ-
ent ways of understanding and presenting that “original where” as
the lost place; for this reason, the exiled seems to be out of himself
in terms of being uprooted because of his lack of home or home-
land: “Once we left them, the exiled stays forever outside, exposed
to the interpretation of others which look themselves through
looking the exiled; something impossible in his own home, his
own geography and history: looking to himself in his own roots
without dropping them at all, without having been pulled out from
him roots” (8). It may be thought that without the limit experience
of exile is quite difficult to find out our own “where.”However, that
“where” emerges stronger and clearer for the exiled, “like that in
which the exile was unconsciously belonging -as Carrasco points
out- appears in all its appropriate appearance” (6). Being excluded
from returning, the exiled is opened to the concrete possibility of
getting the “where” of others, but this is as impossible as it would
be a real and effective change of country, in the sense of a change
from our “original place” to another one. Exile is then experienced
as the impossibility of becoming part of and sharing the “where”
of others. At best, exiled people might be able to settle down their
own “where,” more or less comfortable, in their host country and
thus make it their “adopted country” (6).
Exile appears between two impossibilities: the impossibility of
being unable to be in our own homeland, and the impossibility
to find a proper replacement for it. This leads to a situation of
being “suspended”; that unsteady “betweeness” pointed out by
Carrasco’s etymological approach. This is viewed by Zambrano as
follows: “The impossibility of living even though you realize the
impossibility of dying. The edge between life and deathwhere each
one rejects the other. Holding on that limit is the first unavoidable
requirement of all exiles” (8). Zambrano develops the idea of the
lost of a place and the suspension that involves. According to
the Spanish philosopher, the orphanhood is the most important
feature of exile: “having no place in the world, neither geographic,
social, political nor [.] ontological” (8).
Solanes calls “un-space” (desespacio) that place where the exiled
dwells, which cannot be objectively located and where distances
cannot be estimated by their precise magnitude. Regarding this,
Zambrano contends that exile is the space of vastness that comes
out gradually. “The vastness, an endless desert, the non-existence
of the horizon and the continuous sky, that existent human exper-
imenting that situation has already begun the exile, as an ocean
without any island in sight, no real north, destination or goal” (8).
It is not about the loss of cardinal points which, as we have seen,
represent quantitative differentiates about the “original where,”
but it rather refers to the instability of the idea of having reference
points. “Even the idea of human space is threatened by this expe-
rience in which we do not understand the notion of plan, limits
and dispositions; this shows another idea: the limbo’s idea” (1).
Addressing the experience of time represents a somewhat more
complex issue. Although each author seems to recognize a similar
relevance of the experience of space and time, just Solanes high-
lights the characteristics that time has in the exiled person’s life.
The first thing argued by all of them is that the time’s experience
runs parallel with space. Thus, Carrasco contends that to the
“original where,” which determines individuality, corresponds an
“original time” that is characterized by the individual’s location
throughout human history. On the other hand, Solanes talks about
“un-time” (destiempo) that steams from the idea that the exiled
experiences an uprooted space because he/she is depraved of living
in the own land; thus, he will undergo the experience of time as
“un-time” insofar as he is also expulsed from his original time.
Zambrano assumes a similar perspective. She contends that the
exiled seems to be located on the periphery of history, which
generates the idea that the exiled himself is the past, “a past that is
frozen and is only presence” (9). Just like space, the consciousness
of time of the exiledmust not be understood neither geometrically
conception nor quantitatively: “time running in consciousness –
as Rivas says – is not comparable with either time of everyday life
or that timemeasured by watches; they artificially divide time into
equal or fixed periods” (4).
According to Solanes, there are two affective movements
that help us to understand how exiled people experience time;
although they may be confused with each other, we still talk about
past and future: nostalgia and hope. The nostalgia comes to ensure
the continuity of the self and warns against the stranger that
appears within the place of the exiled: the exiled not only walks
out of his homeland, but also leaves his own self behind him from
the exile. Nostalgia, as it were, struggles against the loss of self.
“Whoever we have been, we still are (: : :) nostalgia proclaims per-
sonal continuity: suffering warrants it” (1). The hope will appear
waiting for the end of the exile, which is thought as finite time;
although it is an undeterminedmoment, therewill be an end in the
temporality of the experience. Nonetheless, this time of an initial
hope will slowly become a wait that becomes longer each day
lacking of concrete spaces to holding on (4). The second function
of nostalgia in exile would be a future function: living for the
return. And this does not mean that the life of exile has no other
purpose than to return home; it implies something more radical:
that life is pointless only after that the return has taken place.
The exiledwill then have a contradictory experience: he notices,
on the one hand, just like in the past, time goes on. On the other
hand, temporality is tied to the concrete vital space from which
the exiled has been expulsed and having no current temporal
experience of that. Thus, the exiled will tend to perceive that
past time as real space to be reached in the future; personal time
will be then measured from the precise time at the moment in
which exile had begun. “Will time be resumed on that day? Much
like exile will be thought to finish at some point, “un-time” is
thought to finish too and will be recovered in the future” (1). The
linear conception of time in which past, present, and future are
interpreted as continuity becomes obsolete in exile; it seems that
is something only possible in the homeland: the originary own
space. Therefore, it may be said that in the temporal condition of
the exiled, time stands still. Looking at the past with nostalgia and
future with hope (1).
Psychopathological Perspective
For irregular migrants settled down in a given territory, expul-
sion can be a vital disaster (10). In exile, however, return may
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become a yearning whose essence is the way to experience time
and space: lived time and lived space (11). We do not experience
temporality in our consciousness as a perpetual succession of
different elements. Actually, lived time appears closely related to
duration, stability, and flowing phenomena across time. They con-
tain part of time in themselves and constitute temporary figures:
the memory with its evocation of the past and the desire and
future-oriented hope. It is in these phenomena in which exile can
be understood as memory, desire, and hope. Moreover, distance
is also interpreted qualitatively; it is not a quantitative distance,
but phenomenological. The experience of this phenomenological
distance is not linked to displacement or the historical path in
exile, but the distance that separates or rather that connects some-
one with life. Phenomenological distance is completely different
from the geometric distance and cannot be overlooked by the
exiled because his temporality is always moving with him. This
sort of distance connects rather than separates; neither grows nor
decreases with being away from objects; and has no boundaries.
Thus, while geometric or quantitative distance is affected in exile,
qualitative distance does not. Indeed, the latter may be considered
as a space to be developed or enhanced; a meeting place with
others (11).
Exile in itself is not a pathological experience, but a condition of
possibility, a way of being in the world. However, psychopathology
manifestations may also occur. A pathological form of experienc-
ing exile in the dimensions of time and space would be in the
form of melancholia (melancholic depression). Tellembach pro-
poses a phenomenological vision of what he calls the endogenous-
melancholic transformation as a way to develop melancholy in
vulnerable people due to their biological (endogenous), psycho-
logical (“typusmellancolicus”), and social conditions: “to place
means including the aroundness in the existential project. If the
other avoids this inclusion, the situation that has been constituted
by the same type (“typusmellancolicus”) becomes pathogenic”
(12). According to author, the constitution of a vital project
ordered in the melancholic is a protection against anxiety to the
extent that the anguished requires to live in a safe and known
environment, in which randomness does not play any role. From
a different epistemology, the idealization of the territory from
which the exile has been exiled may also constitute a defense
against anguish, which aims to protect the positive aspects of an
object – the homeland – from the possibility that negative aspects
cover everything completely (13). Tellembach describes certain
clinical cases ofmelancholy linked to specific situations, including
melancholy due to uprooting (12).
It should be also noted that exile is a condition that allows for
the sociological processes of ethno-cultural exchanges to occur.
According to Sonia Montecinos, miscegenation occurs through
a process where “the purely biological yields to other processes
linked to the history of our territories; the coupling of people
is a coupling of cultures: the acculturation that is the mixture
of cultural elements, and assimilation – i.e., the absorption of
an individual or a people by another culture.” Thus, these two
processes will be the axes of the interconnections of miscegena-
tion, which constitute a dynamic that involves simultaneously
multiple and intricate biological elements (miscegenation), cul-
tural (moral and symbolic), and socioeconomic (hierarchies and
dominations) (14). These processes of acculturation and assim-
ilation will constitute exile cultural exchange, in which the new
place becomes a lived space that links rather than separates, where
there is room for the exchange of cultures, personal, and human
growth.
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